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Abstract 
  This paper considers a mixed triopoly model where a state-owned firm, a domestic 
labor-managed firm and a foreign capitalist firm are allowed to pre-install capacity as a strategic 
commitment device. First, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its capacity level. 
None of the firms can reduce or dispose of capacity. Second, each firm simultaneously and 
independently chooses its output level. The paper shows that there is an equilibrium solution where 
only the domestic labor-managed firm pre-installs excess capacity as a strategic commitment 
device. 
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1. Introduction 
  Many researchers have studied the possibility of firms using excess capacity as a strategic 
commitment device in oligopolistic competition. For instance, Dixit (1980) considers a two-stage 
game model between an incumbent and a potential entrant, and shows that the incumbent installing 
excess capacity in the first stage is able to deter the potential entrant in the second stage. Ware 
(1984) considers three-stage Cournot competition in which an incumbent installs capacity in the 
first stage, an entrant installs capacity in the second stage, and a quantity equilibrium is established 
in the third stage. He demonstrates that although his three-stage equilibrium is qualitatively similar 
to Dixit’s two-stage equilibrium, it differs in that the strategic advantage available to the first mover 
is lessened. In addition, Poddar (2003) examines a two-stage game model of strategic entry 
deterrence under demand uncertainty, and shows that to improve its strategic position in the product 
market competition an incumbent will choose a level of capacity that may remain idle in a low state 
of demand. There is also a great deal of literature (see, for example, Wenders, 1971; Spence, 1977; 
Eaton and Lipsey, 1981; Basu and Singh, 1990; Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer, 1985a; 
Bagwell and Ramey, 1996; Kim, 1996; Ohnishi, 2000; Grenadier, 2002; Novy-Marx, 2007; 
Aguerrevere, 2009). All these researches focus on the behaviors of profit-maximizing firms. 
  The first theoretical study of a state-owned public firm was done by Merrill and Schneider 
(1966), and since then, the theoretical contributions of mixed oligopoly markets including state-owned 
public firms have been made by many researchers all over the world. For instance, Nett (1994) examines 
a mixed duopoly market where a state-owned firm coexists with a capitalist firm, and proves that the 
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capitalist firm produces at a lower variable cost compared to the state-owned firm. He also shows 
that the capitalist firm sells a greater amount of output than the state-owned firm. Poyago-Theotoky 
(1998) considers a mixed R&D duopoly where a state-owned firm and a capitalist firm compete to 
introduce a new product or process under uncertainty and easy imitation, and shows that the 
capitalist firm invests less in R&D than the state-owned firm. There are also many other related 
research works (see, for example, Cremer, Marchand and Thisse, 1991; Willner, 1994; Fjell and Pal, 1996; 
George and La Manna, 1996; Poyago-Theotoky, 2001; Fjell and Heywood, 2002; Beladi and Chao, 2006; 
Chao and Yu, 2006; Bárcena-Ruiz, 2007; Barcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2007; Lu, 2007; Saha and Sensarma, 
2008; Artz, Heywood and McGinty, 2009; Lu and Poddar, 2009; Roy chowdhury, 2009; Wang and Wang, 
2009; Heywood and Ye, 2010; Zhang and Li, 2013; Pal and Saha, 2014; Hsu, Lee and Wang, 2018). All 
these researches examine mixed oligopoly markets in which state-owned public firms compete with 
capitalist firms. 
  The pioneering work on a theoretical model of a labor-managed firm is conducted by Ward 
(1958), and since then, the analysis of mixed oligopoly models with labor-managed and capitalist 
firms has been also frequently encountered in the literature on economic theory. For instance, 
Stewart (1991) explores strategic entry interactions between capitalist and labor-managed firms 
using a framework suggested by Dixit (1980), and shows that a potential labor-managed entrant is 
more likely to be accommodated into the industry than a potential capitalist entrant. He considers 
duopoly competition in which a capitalist or labor-managed incumbent unilaterally chooses a 
pre-entry capacity level to deter entry by a capitalist or labor-managed firm and addresses the issue 
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of noncooperative entry deterrence. Cremer and Crémer (1992) consider duopolistic competition 
where the firms decide both the employment level and the capital stock simultaneously, and show 
that the labor-managed firm produces less output than the capitalist firm in a two-stage Cournot 
duopoly regime. Neary and Ulph (1997) study the relative profitability of labor-managed and 
capitalist firms in a mixed duopoly equilibrium with strategic investment, and show that no 
equilibrium can have both firms making zero profit. Lambertini and Rossini (1998) investigate the 
behaviors of labor-managed and capitalist firms in a two-stage Cournot duopoly model with capital 
strategic interaction, and demonstrate that the capitalist firm always under-invests while the 
labor-managed firm always over-invests. In addition, Ohnishi (2008) clarifies the behaviors of a 
labor-managed firm and a capitalist firm in a quantity-setting model with a strategic commitment, 
and shows that the introduction of capacity investment into the analysis of the mixed duopoly 
model may be effective for the labor-managed firm. There are also a great number of papers (for 
example, see Law and Stewart, 1983; Horowitz, 1991; Stewart, 1992; Askildsen and Ireland, 1993; Ireland 
and Stewart, 1995; Okamura and Futagami, 1998; Lambertini, 2001; Ireland, 2003; Cuccia and Cellini, 2009; 
Luo, 2013; Delbono and Lambertini, 2017). All these researches investigate mixed oligopoly markets 
where labor-managed firms compete against capitalist firms. 
  Only a few papers have been published on the study of mixed oligopoly models with 
state-owned and labor-managed firms. For example, Delbono and Rossini (1992) investigate a 
mixed duopoly formed by a state-owned firm and a labor-managed firm in a Cournot-Nash setting, 
and show that there is a unique locally stable equilibrium in which the state-owned firm produces 
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more than the labor-managed firm produces. 
  We consider a mixed triopoly model in which there are a state-owned firm, a labor-managed 
firm and a capitalist firm. Ohnishi (2018) examines a market comprising a labor-managed firm, a 
capitalist firm and a state-owned firm, and demonstrates that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium 
in which only the labor-managed firm installs excess capacity as a strategic device. This present 
paper extends Ohnishi’s (2018) framework by examining a model of international mixed triopoly. 
  This paper examines a model in which there are a state-owned firm, a domestic labor-managed 
firm and a foreign capitalist firm. The following situation is considered. In the first stage, each firm 
non-cooperatively chooses its capacity level. No firms can reduce or dispose of capacity. In the 
second stage, each firm non-cooperatively chooses its output. We discuss the subgame perfect 
equilibrium of the model. 
  The purpose of this paper is to show the equilibrium outcome of international mixed tripoly 
competition where a state-owned firm, a domestic labor-managed firm and a foreign capitalist firm 
can install capacity as a strategic device. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is described. Section 
3 gives supplementary explanations of the model. Section 4 discusses the equilibrium of the model. 
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
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2. Model 
  There is a market composed of a domestic state-owned firm (firm S), a domestic labor-managed 
firm (firm DL) and a foreign capitalist firm (firm FC). In the remainder of this paper, subscripts S, 
DL and FC denote firm S, firm DL and firm FC, respectively. They produce perfectly substitutable 
goods. There is no possibility of entry or exit. The inverse demand function is represented by 
( )P Q , where S DL FCQ q q q . We assume that S DL FC( )dP dQ P q P q P q  
0 , 22 2 2 2 2 2 2S DL FC( ) 0d P dQ P q P q P q , and 
22 0idP dQ q P Q  (i 
= S, DL, FC). Note that this assumption is used in many papers of mixed oligopoly (see, for 
example, Stewart, 1991; Delbono and Rossini, 1992; Okuguchi, 1993; Lambertini, 1997; 
Lambertini and Rossini, 1998; Ohnishi, 2009). 
  The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm i (i = S, DL, FC) 
simultaneously and independently chooses its capacity level 0ik . None of the firms can reduce 
or dispose of capacity. At the end of the first stage, each firm observes Sk , DLk  and FCk . In the 
second stage, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its output level 0iq . 
  Therefore, each firm’s profit is given by 
  S DL FC
( ) ( ) ( ) ,if
( , , )
( ) ( ) ( ) ,if
i i i i i
i
i i i i i
P Q q w q r q f q k
q q q
P Q q w q r k f q k
                 (1) 
where w  denotes the labor cost function, r  is the capital cost function, and 0f  is the fixed 
cost. We assume 0idw dq , 
2 2 0id w dq , 0idr dq  and 
2 2 0id r dq .
1 Firm FC 
                                                 
1 We assume that the firms share the same cost function and the marginal cost of production is 
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chooses FCk  and FCq  in order to maximize its own profit. 
  Economic welfare, which is the sum of consumers’ surplus and domestic producers’ surplus, is 
given by 
S S DL DL FC0 S S
S DL FC
S S
S S DL DL FC0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 ,if
( , , )
.if( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3
Q
Q
P x dx w q r q w q r q Pq f q k
W q q q
q kP x dx w q r k w q r q Pq f
(2) 
Firm S chooses Sk  and Sq  in order to maximize economic welfare. 
  Firm DL’s income per worker is given by 
  
DL DL
DL DL
DL
DL S DL FC
DL DL
DL DL
DL
( ) ( ) if ,
( )
( , , )
( ) ( )
if ,
( )
P Q q r q f q k
l q
q q q
P Q q r k f
q k
l q
                   (3) 
where 0l  denotes the labor input function. We assume that DL 0dl dq  and 
2 2
DL 0d l dq . Firm DL chooses DLk  and DLq  in order to maximize income per worker. 
  Firm i cannot reduce and dispose of capacity. If firm i installs capacity, then ( )ir k  is sunk. 
Therefore, if i iq k , then firm i’s marginal cost is idw dq  and exhibits a discontinuity at 
i iq k . This irreversible behavior causes changes to the quantity-setting competing environment 
                                                                                                                                               
increasing. This assumption is often used in literature studying mixed oligopoly markets (for 
example, Harris and Wiens, 1980; Ware, 1986; Delbono and Rossini, 1992; Delbono and Scarpa, 
1995; Fjell and Pal, 1996; White, 1996; Pal and White, 1998; Poyago-Theotoky, 1998; Fjell and 
Heywood, 2002; Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2003; Matsumura and Kanda, 2005; Ohnishi, 2008; 
Hsu, Lee and Wang, 2018). If the marginal cost of production is constant or decreasing, then firm S 
produces an output such that price equals marginal cost and results in a public monopoly. 
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of the second stage and makes the capacity commitment credible as a strategic device. 
  In this paper, we adopt subgame perfection as our equilibrium concept. Since the inverse 
demand function is defined only for non-negative outputs, it is ensured that all outputs obtained in 
equilibrium are non-negative. 
 
 
3. Supplementary explanations 
  This section gives supplementary explanations of the model described in the previous section. 
First, we derive firm S’s reaction function from (2). If firm S’s marginal cost is S Sdw dq dr dq , 
then its reaction function is defined by 
  
S
S DL FC S S DL DL FC0{ 0}
( , ) arg max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Q
q
R q q P x dx w q r q w q r q Pq ,     (4) 
and if firm S reduces its marginal cost to Sdw dq , then its reaction function is defined by 
  
S
S DL FC S S DL DL FC0{ 0}
( , ) arg max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Qk
q
R q q P x dx w q r k w q r q Pq .     (5) 
Therefore, if firm S installs Sk , then its best response is shown as follows: 
  
S DL FC S S
S DL FC S S S
S DL FC S S
( , ) if ,
ˆ ( , ) if ,
( , ) if .k
R q q q k
R q q k q k
R q q q k
                                 (6) 
  Firm S cannot reduce and dispose of capacity. This irreversible behavior causes changes to the 
quantity-setting competing environment, and economic welfare becomes (2). If firm S installs no 
capacity, then its reaction function is defined by (4). On the other hand, if firm S installs capacity 
and reduces its marginal cost of production, then its reaction function is defined by (5). Therefore, 
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by strategic choice of capacity, firm S’s best response becomes (6). Firm S’s investment choice thus 
creates kinks in the reaction curve at the level of installed capacity. 
  We now present the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: Under Cournot competition, firm S’s reaction functions to firm DL are downward 
sloping, whereas firm S’s reaction functions to firm FC are upward sloping. 
 
Proof: Firm S aims to maximize economic welfare with respect to Sq , given DLq  and FCq . The 
equilibrium needs to satisfy the following conditions. If firm S’s marginal cost is 
S Sdw dq dr dq , the first-order condition for (4) is 
  FC
S S
0,dw dr dPP q
dq dq dQ
                                              (7) 
and the second-order condition for (4) is 
  
2 2 2
FC2 2 2
S S
0.dP d w d r d Pq
dQ dq dq dQ
                                          (8) 
Therefore, we have 
  
2 2
S DL FC FC
2 2 2 2 2 2
DL S S FC
( , )R q q dP dQ q d P dQ
q dP dQ d w d q d r d q q d P dQ
               (9) 
and 
  
2 2
S DL FC FC
2 2 2 2 2 2
FC S S FC
( , ) .R q q q d P dQ
q dP dQ d w d q d r d q q d P dQ
                  (10) 
Here, ∂RS (qDL, qFC) / ∂qDL is negative, and firm S’s reaction function to firm DL’s output slopes 
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downward, whereas from (10), ∂RS (qDL, qFC) / ∂qFC is positive, and firm S’s reaction function to 
firm FC’s output slopes upward. 
  In addition, if firm S reduces its marginal cost to Sdw dq , the first-order condition for (5) is 
  FC
S
0,dw dPP q
dq dQ
                                                   (11) 
and the second-order condition for (5) is 
  
2 2
FC2 2
S
0.dP d w d Pq
dQ dq dQ
                                              (12) 
Therefore, we have 
  
2 2
S DL FC FC
2 2 2 2
DL S FC
( , )R q q dP dQ q d P dQ
q dP dQ d w d q q d P dQ
                         (13) 
and 
  
2 2
S DL FC FC
2 2 2 2
FC S FC
( , ) .R q q q d P dQ
q dP dQ d w d q q d P dQ
                          (14) 
Here, ∂RS (qDL, qFC) / ∂qDL is negative, and firm S’s reaction function to firm DL’s output slopes 
downward, whereas from (14), firm S’s reaction function to firm FC’s output is upward sloping. 
Q.E.D. 
 
  Second, we derive firm DL’s reaction function from (3). If firm DL does not install capacity, then 
its reaction function is defined by 
  
DL
DL DL
DL S FC { 0}
DL
( ) ( )( , ) arg max
( )q
P Q q r q fR q q
l q
,                           (15) 
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and if firm DL installs DLk  and produces DL DLq k , then its reaction function is defined by 
  
DL
DL DL
DL S FC { 0}
DL
( ) ( )( , ) arg max
( )
k
q
P Q q r k fR q q
l q
.                             (16) 
Therefore, if firm DL installs DLk , then its best response is as follows: 
  
DL S FC DL DL
DL S FC DL DL DL
DL S FC DL DL
( , ) if ,
ˆ ( , ) if ,
( , ) if .k
R q q q k
R q q k q k
R q q q k
                            (17) 
  We now state the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 2: Under Cournot competition, both DLR  and DLkR  are upward sloping. 
 
Proof: Firm DL seeks to maximize income per worker with respect to DLq , given Sq  and FCq . 
The equilibrium solution satisfies the following conditions. The first-order condition for (15) is 
  DL DL
DL DL
0,dP dr dlq P l Pq r f
dQ dq dq
                          (18) 
and the second-order condition for (15) is 
  
2 2 2
DL DL2 2 2
DL DL
2 0.d P dP d r d lq l Pq r f
dQ dQ dq dq
                       (19) 
Moreover, we obtain 
  
DL S FC DL S FC
S FC
2 2
DL DL DL
2 2 2 2 2 2
DL DL DL DL
( , ) ( , )
( ) .
2
R q q R q q
q q
q l d P dQ l q dl dq dP dQ
q d P dQ dP dQ d r dq l Pq r f d l dq
          (20) 
  In addition, the first-order condition for (16) is 
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  DL DL
DL
0,dP dlq P l Pq f
dQ dq
                                    (21) 
and the second-order condition for (16) is 
  
2 2
DL DL2 2
DL
2 0.d P dP d lq l Pq f
dQ dQ dq
                                 (22) 
Therefore, we obtain 
2 2
DL S FC DL S FC DL DL DL
2 2 2 2
S FC DL DL DL
( , ) ( , ) ( ) .
2
k kR q q R q q q l d P dQ l q dl dq dP dQ
q q q d P dQ dP dQ l Pq f d l dq
(23) 
Since 2 2DL 0d l dq , DL DL 0l q dl dq , so that 
2 2
DL DL DLq l d P dQ l q dl dq  
dP dQ  is positive. Q.E.D. 
 
  Third, we derive firm FC’s reaction function from (1). If firm FC’s marginal cost is 
FC FCdw dq dr dq , then its reaction function is defined by 
  
FC
FC S DL FC FC FC{ 0}
( , ) arg max ( ) ( ) ( )
q
R q q p Q q w q r q f ,                     (24) 
and if firm FC reduces its marginal cost to FCdw dq , then its reaction function is defined by 
  
FC
FC S DL FC FC FC{ 0}
( , ) arg max ( ) ( ) ( )k
q
R q q p Q q w q r k f .                     (25) 
Therefore, if firm FC installs FCk , then its best response changes as follows: 
  
FC S DL FC FC
FC S DL FC FC FC
FC S DL FC FC
( , ) if ,
ˆ ( , ) if ,
( , ) if .k
R q q q k
R q q k q k
R q q q k
                               (26) 
  We present the following lemma. 
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Lemma 3: Under Cournot competition, both FCR  and FC
kR  are downward sloping. 
 
Proof: Firm FC aims to maximize its profit with respect to FCq , given Sq  and DLq . The 
equilibrium outcome needs to satisfy the following conditions: The first-order condition for (24) is 
  FC
FC FC
0,dP dw drq P
dQ dq dq
                                           (27) 
and the second-order condition for (24) is 
  2
2 2 2
FC 2 2
FC FC
2 0.d P dP d w d rq
dQ dq dqdQ
                                       (28) 
Moreover, we obtain 
2 2
FC S DL FC S DL FC
2 22 2 2 2
S DL FC FC FC
( , ) ( , ) ,
2
R q q R q q dP dQ q d P dQ
q q dP dQ q d P dQ d w dq d r dq
  (29) 
where 2 2FC 0dP dQ q d P dQ . 
  In addition, the first-order condition for (25) is 
  FC
FC
0,dP drq P
dQ dq
                                                 (30) 
and the second-order condition for (25) is 
  2
2 2
FC 2
FC
2 0.d P dP d rq
dQ dqdQ
                                              (31) 
Therefore, we obtain 
  
2 2
FC S DL FC S DL FC
22 2 2
S DL FC FC
( , ) ( , ) ,
2
k kR q q R q q dP dQ q d P dQ
q q dP dQ q d P dQ d r dq
         (32) 
where 2 2FC 0dP dQ q d P dQ . Q.E.D. 
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  Fourth, we present the following lemmas, which provide characterizations of capacity as a 
strategic commitment device. 
 
Lemma 4: Firm i’s optimal output is higher when it installs capacity than when it does not. 
 
Proof: We prove that firm S’s welfare-maximizing output is larger when it installs capacity than 
when it does not. From (2), we see that capacity investment will never increase firm S’s marginal 
cost of production. When firm S’s marginal cost of production is S Sdw dq dr dq , the 
first-order condition is (7), and when its marginal cost of production is Sdw dq , the first-order 
condition is (11). Here, Sdr dq  is positive. To satisfy (7), FCSP dw dq q dP dQ  must be 
positive. Thus, firm S’s welfare-maximizing output is larger when its marginal cost is Sdw dq  
than when its marginal cost is S Sdw dq dr dq . 
  The proofs for firm DL and firm FC are omitted, since they are similar to the above proof of this 
lemma. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 5: If firm i  installs ik  and an equilibrium solution is achieved, then at equilibrium 
i iq k . 
 
Proof: We prove that if firm DL installs capacity, then at equilibrium DL DLq k . Consider the 
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possibility that DL DLq k  at equilibrium. From (3), when firm DL installs capacity, its income per 
worker is 
  DL DLDL S DL FC
DL
( ) ( )( , , )
( )
P Q q r k fq q q
l q
. 
Here, since DL DLq k , firm DL installs the extra capacity. However, firm DL can increase income 
per worker by reducing DLk , and the equilibrium point does not change in DL DLq k . Hence, 
DL DLq k  does not result in an equilibrium solution. 
  Consider the possibility that DL DLq k  at equilibrium. From (3), we see that it is impossible for 
firm DL to change its output at equilibrium because such a strategy is not credible. That is, capacity 
investment does not function as a strategic commitment. 
  The proofs for firm S and firm FC are similar, so they are omitted. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma 4 means that if firm i  installs capacity in advance of production, then its optimal output 
increases. Lemma 5 indicates that at equilibrium firm i  does not install extra capacity. 
 
 
4. Equilibrium 
  We first discuss the possibility in which only firm FC installs excess capacity. Firm FC aims to 
maximize its own profit. Therefore, it is thought that firm FC will install capacity if its profit 
increases by doing so, while firm FC will not install capacity if its profit decreases by doing so. 
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Firm FC’s investment choice decreases its marginal cost and increases its output. Firm FC cannot 
reduce or dispose of capacity. This irreversible behavior causes changes to the quantity-setting 
competing environment of the second stage, and firm FC’s profit becomes (1). Therefore, firm 
FC’s best response becomes (9). 
  The installation of capacity by firm FC increases its optimal output (Lemma 4). Given firm S’s 
and firm DL’s output, increasing firm FC’s output increases the total market output, thereby 
increasing economic welfare. Furthermore, firm S’s optimal strategy must yield at least this 
economic welfare. Increasing firm FC’s output increases firm S’s output (Lemma 1), increasing 
firm S’s output decreases firm FC’s output (Lemma 3), thereby decreasing firm FC’s profit. 
  In addition, increasing firm FC’s output increases firm DL’s output (Lemma 2), and increasing 
firm DL’s output decreases firm FC’s output (Lemma 3). This also decreases firm FC’s profit. 
  We can state the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that only firm FC installs excess capacity. Then, (i) firm FC’s profit falls, 
(ii) economic welfare rises, and (iii) firm DL’s income per worker falls. 
 
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
  Second, we consider the possibility in which only firm DL installs excess capacity. Firm DL 
aims to maximize income per worker. Therefore, it is thought that firm DL will install capacity if its 
 17
income per worker increases by doing so, while firm DL will not install capacity if its income per 
worker decreases by doing so. Firm DL’s investment choice decreases its marginal cost and 
increases its output. Firm DL cannot reduce or dispose of capacity. This irreversible behavior 
causes changes to the Cournot competing environment of stage two. Firm DL’s income per worker 
becomes (3), and therefore firm DL’s best response is (12). 
  The installation of capacity by firm DL increases its optimal output (Lemma 4). Given firm FC’s 
output level, increasing firm DL’s output increases the total market output and lowers the price, 
thereby decreasing firm FC’s profit. Furthermore, firm FC’s optimal strategy decreases its output 
because of strategic substitutes. This increases firm DL’s income per worker. 
  The installation of capacity by firm DL increases its optimal output (Lemma 4). Given firm S’s 
and firm FC’s output levels, increasing firm DL’s output increases the total market output and also 
increases economic welfare. Furthermore, firm S’s optimal strategy must yield at least this 
economic welfare. Increasing firm DL’s output decreases firm S’s output (Lemma 1), thereby 
increasing firm DL’s income per worker. 
  We state the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose that only firm DL installs excess capacity. Then, (i) firm DL’s income per 
worker rises, (ii) economic welfare rises, and (iii) firm FC’s profit falls. 
 
Proof: See the appendix. 
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  Third, we consider the possibility in which only firm S installs excess capacity. Firm S aims to 
maximize economic welfare. Therefore, it is thought that firm S will install capacity if economic 
welfare increases by doing so, while firm S will not install capacity if economic welfare decreases 
by doing so. Firm S’s investment choice decreases its marginal cost and increases its output. Firm S 
cannot reduce or dispose of capacity. Economic welfare becomes (2), and hence firm S’s best 
response becomes (6). 
  The installation of capacity by firm S increases its optimal output (Lemma 4). Given firm DL’s 
and firm FC’s output, increasing firm S’s output increases the total output and lowers the price, 
thereby decreasing firm FC’s profit and firm DL’s income per worker. Firm FC decreases its 
optimal output by strategic substitutes. This also decreases economic welfare. On the other hand, 
firm DL increases its optimal output by strategic complements, thereby improving economic 
welfare. 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose that only firm S installs excess capacity. Then, (i) economic welfare may 
rise or fall, (ii) firm DL’s income per worker falls, and (iii) firm FC’s profit falls. 
 
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
Proposition 1 means that there may be no possibility in which firm FC installs excess capacity. 
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Proposition 2 indicates that firm DL installs excess capacity if firm S and firm FC do not. 
Proposition 3 states that unilateral capacity installation by firm S decreases firm DL’s income per 
worker and firm FC’s profit. 
  We now state the main result of this study in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: In the international mixed triopoly model, there is an equilibrium solution where 
only firm DL installs excess capacity. At equilibrium, economic welfare and firm DL’s income per 
worker are higher than in the quantity-setting game with no capacity, whereas firm FC’s profit is 
lower than in the quantity-setting game with no capacity. 
 
Proof: See the appendix. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
  We have examined a mixed triopoly model in which a state-owned firm, a domestic 
labor-managed firm and a foreign capitalist firm are allowed to install capacity as a strategic device. 
We have shown that there is an equilibrium solution where only the domestic labor-managed firm 
pre-installs excess capacity as a strategic device. As a result of this analysis, we find that excess 
capacity is an effective strategy for state-owned and domestic labor-managed firms in the 
international mixed triopoly regime. 
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 1-4 
 
  We begin by proving the following supplementary lemmas. 
 
Lemma A1: Firm FC’s Stackelberg leader output is lower than its Cournot output. 
 
Proof: When firm FC is a Stackelberg leader, it maximizes FC FC DL FC S FC( , ( ), ( ))q R q R q  with 
respect to FCq . The first-order condition for Stackelberg profit maximization is 
  SDLFC FC FC
FC FC FC FC
0,RdP dw dr dP R dPq P q q
dQ dq dq dQ q dQ q
                   (33) 
where 0dP dQ , DL FC 0R q  (Lemma 2), and S FC 0R q  (Lemma 1). To satisfy 
(33), FC FC FCq dP dQ P dw dq dr dq  must be positive. Hence, Lemma A1 is proved. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A2: Firm DL’s Stackelberg leader output is higher than its Cournot output. 
 
Proof: If firm DL is a Stackelberg leader, then it maximizes DL DL FC DL S DL( , ( ), ( ))q R q R q  with 
respect to DLq , and the first-order condition is 
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  FC SDL DL DL DL
DL DL DL DL
0,R RdP dr dl dP dPq P l Pq r f q l q l
dQ dq dq dQ q dQ q
 (34) 
where 0dP dQ , FC DL 0R q  (Lemma 3), and S DL 0R q  (Lemma 1). To satisfy 
(34), DL DL DL DLq dP dQ P dr dq l Pq r f dl dq  must be negative. Thus, Lemma 
A2 follows. Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma A3: Firm S’s Stackelberg leader output may be higher or lower than its Cournot output. 
 
Proof: When firm S is a Stackelberg leader, it maximizes FC S DL S S( ( ), ( ), )W R q R q q  with respect 
to Sq , and the first-order condition for welfare maximization is 
  FC DLS S
S S S S
0,Rdw dr dP dP RP q q
dq dq dQ q dQ q
                               (35) 
where 0dP dQ , FC S 0R q  (Lemma 3), and DL S 0R q  (Lemma 2). If 
FC S DL S 0R q R q , then firm S’s Stackelberg leader output exceeds its Cournot output, 
and if FC S DL S 0R q R q , the large/small relation is reverse. Q.E.D. 
 
  We now prove Propositions 1-4. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
(i) Firm FC’s Stackelberg leader output is lower than its Cournot output (Lemma A1). Moreover, 
FC S DL FC FC FC FC( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q q P Q q w q r q f  is continuous and concave with respect to 
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DCq . The farther firm FC’s output gets from firm its Stackelberg leader output, the more its profit 
decreases. However, firm FC’s profit maximizing output when it installs capacity is larger than that 
when it does not (Lemma 4). Given firm S’s and firm DL’s output, increasing firm FC’s output 
increases the total market output and lowers the price. However, firm S’s and firm DL’s optimal 
strategies increase their outputs because of strategic complements, thereby decreasing firm FC’s 
profit. 
(ii) Proposition 1 (ii) is true because S DL FC FC FC( , , ) 0W q q q q P q . 
(iii) Proposition 1 (iii) follows because DL S DL FC FC DL( , , ) 0q q q q q dP dQ . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
(i) Firm DL’s Stackelberg leader output is higher than its Cournot output (Lemma A2). Moreover, 
DL S DL FC DL DL DL( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )q q q P Q q r q f l q  is continuous and concave in DCq . The 
farther firm DL’s output gets from its Stackelberg leader output, the more its income per worker 
decreases. Firm DL’s optimal output when it installs capacity is larger than that when it does not 
(Lemma 4). When firm DL installs DLk  and an equilibrium solution is achieved, at equilibrium 
DL DLq k  (Lemma 5). Hence, Proposition 2 (i) is true. 
(ii) Proposition 2 (ii) follows because S DL FC DL DL DL( , , ) 0W q q q q P dw dq dr dq . 
(iii) Proposition 2 (iii) follows because FC S DL FC DL FC( , , ) 0q q q q q dP dQ . Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 3 
(i) Firm S’s Stackelberg leader output may be higher or lower than its Cournot output (Lemma A3). 
Firm S’s welfare-maximizing output when it installs capacity is larger than that when it does not 
(Lemma 4). If S DL S S FC S 0q dP dQ R q q dP dQ R q , then SP dw dq  
S 0dr dq , and therefore economic welfare falls by installing excess capacity. On the other hand, 
if S DL S S FC S 0q dP dQ R q q dP dQ R q , then S S 0P dw dq dr dq , 
and therefore economic welfare rises. 
(ii) Proposition 3 (ii) is true because DL S DL FC S DL( , , ) 0q q q q q dP dQ . 
(iii) Proposition 3 (iii) is true because FC S DL FC DL FC( , , ) 0q q q q q dP dQ . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
  We first prove each firm’s strategy, and then prove the second half of the proposition. 
 
Firm DL’s Strategy 
  Firm DL’s Stackelberg leader output is higher than its Cournot output (Lemma A2). Furthermore, 
DL DL DL DL( ( ) ( ) ) ( )p Q q r q f l q  is continuous and concave in DLq . The farther firm 
DL’s output gets from firm its Stackelberg leader output, the more its income per worker decreases. 
Lemma 4 states that firm DL’s income-per-worker-maximizing output is larger when it installs 
capacity than when it does not. Given firm S’s and firm FC’s output, increasing firm DL’s output 
increases the total market output and lowers the price. However, firm FC’s and firm S’s optimal 
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strategies decrease their outputs because of strategic substitutes, thereby increasing firm DL’s 
income per worker. Hence, firm DL installs the appropriate level of capacity. 
 
Firm FC’s Strategy 
  Firm FC’s Stackelberg leader output is lower than its Cournot output (Lemma A1). Furthermore, 
FC FC FC FC( ) ( ) ( )p Q q w q r q f  is continuous and concave with respect to FCq . In DLR , 
firm FC’s profit is highest at firm FC’s Stackelberg leader point, and the farther the point on DLR  
gets from firm FC’s Stackelberg leader point, the more firm FC’s profit decreases. Lemma 4 states 
that firm FC’s profit-maximizing output when it installs capacity is larger than that when it does 
not. 
  Next, we consider the possibility that both firm FP and firm DL install capacity. From (17), we 
see that firm DL’s reaction function has a flat segment at DLk  level. Lemma 4 states that firm DL’s 
income-per-worker-maximizing output is larger when it installs capacity than when it does not. A 
little increase in firm FC’s output does not change firm DL’s output, and therefore this decreases 
firm FC’s profit. That is, firm FC’s capacity installation decreases its own profit. Hence, firm FC 
has no incentive to install capacity. 
 
Firm S’s Strategy 
  Firm S’s Stackelberg leader output may be higher or lower than its Cournot output (Lemma A3). 
Furthermore, 0 S S DL DL FC( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 3
QW p x dx w q r q w q r q Pq f  is continuous 
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and concave with respect to Sq . In FCR , economic welfare is the highest at firm S’s Stackelberg 
leader point. However, Lemma 4 states that firm S’s welfare maximizing output when it installs 
capacity is larger than that when it does not. 
  At the end of the first stage, firm S observes DL 0k . From (17), we see that if firm DL installs 
DLk , then its reaction function will have a flat segment at DLk  level. Firm S’s capacity installation 
increases its optimal output (Lemma 4). A little increase in firm S’s output does not change firm 
DL’s output, thereby decreasing economic welfare. That is, firm S’s capacity installation decreases 
economic welfare. Hence, firm S has no incentive to install capacity. 
 
Payoffs 
  The installation of capacity by firm DL increases its optimal output (Lemma 4). Given firm S’s 
and firm FC’s output, increasing firm DL’s output increases the total market output and lowers the 
price. However, firm FC’s and firm S’s optimal strategies decrease their outputs because of 
strategic substitutes. Lemma 5 shows that if firm DL installs DLk  and an equilibrium is achieved, 
then at equilibrium DL DLq k . Hence, firm DL increases income per worker. 
  The installation of capacity by firm DL increases DLq . Since FC S DL FC DL( , , )q q q q  
FC 0q dP dQ , increasing DLq  decreases FC  given Sq  and FCq . In addition, since 
S DL FC DL DL DL( , , ) 0W q q q q P dw dq dr dq , increasing DLq  increases W  given 
Sq  and FCq . Thus, Proposition 4 is true. Q.E.D. 
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